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Abstract
The question of what is “good” or “poor” performance is difficult to answer without ap-
plying a reference point–a standard for comparison. Citizens’ evaluation of performance
information will therefore tend to be guided by reference points. We test how reference
points alter citizens’ evaluation of organizational performance. Specifically, drawing on
Herbert Simon, we test how citizens use historical (internal) and social (external) refer-
ence points when making relative comparisons: How important is performance relative
to past performance? And how important is performance relative to the performance of
other organizations? Two experiments are embedded within a large nationally representa-
tive sample of citizens (n=3443). The experiments assign historical and social reference
points for performance data on education and unemployment to citizens. We find that cit-
izens’ performance evaluation is fundamentally a relative process. Interestingly, we show
that social reference points are almost twice as important to citizens’ evaluations as his-
torical reference points. We find mixed evidence of a negativity bias in citizens’ relative
evaluations. The strong social reference point effects have implications for studying cit-
izens’ response to performance and how managers can frame and manipulate external
performance data.
KEYWORDS: performance information · reference points · experiments · citizen satisfac-
tion
∗I am grateful to Oliver James, Fabrizio Gilardi, George Boyne, Soeren Serritzlew, and Gregg Van Ryzin for comments
on earlier drafts on this paper. An earlier version was presented at the Midwest Political Association Meeting. Panel: Po-
litical Bias, Misinformation, and Conspiracy Theories. Chicago, 11th of April 2013. A more recent version was presented
the 11th Public Management Research Conference in Madison, Wisconsin, June 20-23 2013. Funding: This research was
made possible by a grant from the Master of Public Governance (MPG) at the University of Copenhagen and Copenhagen
Business School in Denmark. Project title: The Psychology of the Public Sector and the experiments conducted in this
article have received funding from the Center for Voting and Parties (CVAP), Department of Political Science, University
of Copenhagen, Denmark.
...the only sound basis for decisions about numbers is numerical factual information about
past experiences or the experiences of others–nothing more nor less than comparative
statistics.
– Herbert A. Simon (1939: 106)
The abundance of quantitative performance information available to the public raises the fundamental
question of how citizens make sense of all this data (Boyne et al. 2009; James 2011a; 2011b; Char-
bonneau and Van Ryzin 2015; Baekgaard and Serritzlew 2015; Marvel 2015; Olsen 2015). School
rankings are offered to inform voice and exit in educational choice. Hospital report cards guide criti-
cal health care decisions. Monthly unemployment rates are featured prominently in the media to help
citizens hold politicians accountable on their economic promises. However, the data does not speak
for itself (Moynihan 2008, 108–109). In fact, Herbert Simon raised strong concerns about how aver-
age citizens were to make sense of performance data: ”It is little wonder then that the layman today
finds himself bewildered...Not only is it difficult for him to decide what his city should be doing, but
it is even more difficult for him to decide whether it is being done well.” (Ridley and Simon 1940, 1).
Indeed, simple questions have no easy or straightforward answers: How good is a top-100 school? Is
a hospital with a 90 percent satisfaction rate performing well? Can we be satisfied with an unemploy-
ment rate of 6 pct?
How do citizens map these absolute numbers onto a subjective scale of good and poor perfor-
mance from which they can make informed decisions? While Herbert Simon was deeply concerned
with this question, he also pointed to a potential solution: The necessity of evoking comparisons in
performance evaluations as exemplified in the epitaph and in many other instances throughout his
work (Simon 1937; 1938; 1939; Simon and Ridley 1938). The need for comparison of performance
information was also a key issue in the early 20th century attempt to measure government performance
(Upton 1915; Freeman 1954; Williams 2003) and is reflected today in the many studies on the role of
benchmarking for managerial decision making (Ammons 1999; Ammons and Roenigk 2014; Askim
2007). However, only very recently has experimental work attempted to understand the importance of
relative comparisons for citizens’ performance evaluations (James 2011a; James and Moseley 2014;
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Charbonneau and Van Ryzin 2015). Still, fundamental questions about reference points remain unan-
swered: How important is relative performance evaluation? And what types of reference points do
citizens actually draw on for performance comparisons?
In this article, we study the role and effects of performance reference points for citizens’ evalua-
tion of public services. We conduct two vignette experiments embedded in large-scale representative
sample of the Danish population (n = 3443). Specifically, we aim to answer two important questions
derived from a reference-dependent view of citizens’ judgment about performance information (Muss-
weiler 2003; Tversky and Kahneman 1991): When asked to evaluate some element of the social world
many tend to respond: compared to what? This question points to the source of comparison–the ref-
erence point. We take Herbert Simons proposal to test and estimate how citizens rely on social and
historical reference points (Simon 1937; 1939). Social reference points stress that comparison happens
by looking at the performance of other organizations. It can be the neighboring school, the hospitals in
another city, or the employment rate in other countries. Historical reference points denote a temporal
comparison between current and previous performance. How did we do last month, in previous years,
or in the past decade compared with today? The analysis presented here will allow us to compare the
importance of these two fundamentally difference ways for how citizens make relative performance
evaluations.
Second, we ask how losses and gains differ when using social and historical reference points.
Political science has long been interested in the negativity bias (Lau 1982). In short, negativity bias
denotes that negative information has more profound effects on attitudes and behavior than positive
information of a similar magnitude (Baumeister et al. 2001). The negativity bias has also been found
relevant for understanding how citizens respond to performance information (Boyne et al. 2009; James
2011a; James and Moseley 2014). In terms of implications, the negativity bias has been noted as
the underlying driving force for blame avoidance among managers and politicians (Weaver 1986).
The question is how the negativity bias works in relation to historical and social reference points. Is
performing relatively poorly punished in the same manner as being relatively good is rewarded?
In order to test these questions we employ a novel survey experimental design. The survey ex-
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periments ask individuals to evaluate two types of performance information, namely: (a) school per-
formance from grade average information and (b) municipal unemployment performance from local
unemployment rates. As a unique feature we are not only randomly assigning the type of reference
point that citizens are exposed to but also the relative distance between the organization’s performance
and the performance of the reference point. This provides a very direct causal test of how citizens’
evaluations are altered as the relative difference in performance shifts. This is to our knowledge, the
first experiment in public administration which allows to causally test how various levels of both his-
torical and social relative performance affect citizens’ evaluations of public services. Moreover, this
design can easily be implemented by others in order to understand relative performance effects in
other contexts and for other actors (e.g., policy makers and managers).
The results point to that relative performance evaluation is very important to citizens. Most strik-
ingly, across both experiments, we find that social reference points have a stronger impact on citizens’
evaluations than historical reference points. That is, citizens are more inclined to draw on a refererence
point which indicates the performance of other organizations than a reference point which captures
the historical performance of the very same organization they are evaluating. Findings on the nega-
tivity bias are more mixed and seem to depend more on type of performance measure than the actual
reference point. However, interestingly, we find that relative performance has the strongest impact on
evaluations in the near vicinity of the reference point.
The findings have a number of implications for both public administration research and the practice
of managers. First, it adds to the century old call for empirical research into how the presentation of
performance information affect citizens’ perception of public services (Simon 1937; Freeman 1954).
Second, it calls for further research into the downstream effects in terms of managers use of reference
point as a means to give a more positive impression of their organization’s performance (Moynihan
2008). The importance of social reference points raises concerns about subtle ways to game and ma-
nipulate the information that citizens are served (Smith 1995). Finally, understanding the importance
of relative performance evaluations and the reference points they rely on have implications for how
we study citizens’ satisfaction with the public sector and democracy (Parks 1984; Van Ryzin 2004).
These implications will be discussed in greater detail in the concluding section.
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS
Reference Points and the Evaluation of Performance Information
Since the early days, public administration scholars have been concerned with how (if at all) citi-
zens make meaningful use of performance information about public services (Willimott 1924; Ridley
and Simon 1940; Freeman 1954; Williams 2004). For Herbert Simon the possibility of comparing
the performance of an organization with some standard was seen as a key instrument for unlocking
the potential of performance information (Simon 1937; 1939). However, since then surprisingly little
empirical work has been done on citizens use of ”comparative statistics”. James (2011a) finds that
good relative performance information raises citizen satisfaction while bad relative performance in-
formation tends to lower citizen satisfaction. James and Moseley (2014) find something similar in a
field experiment and also suggests that relative comparisons of performance leads citizens’ to attribute
more responsibility to local service providers. Before outlining our hypothesis on the various sources
of reference points, we will outline how the early focus on comparisons in public administration ties
in with parallel developments in cognitive and social psychology.
The fundamental argument put forward here will be that citizens’ judgment about public services
is highly reference dependent: Citizens compare an organization’s performance with some reference
point in order to arrive at a relative measure of performance. Accordingly, from a formal definition a
reference points is a: ”stimuli of known attributes that act as standards against which other categori-
cally similar stimuli of unknown attributes are compared in order to gain information” (Yockey and
Kruml 2009, 97). We can therefore think of a reference point as a standard or yardstick against which
citizens can compare the performance information of a given organization. In performance manage-
ment we are used to think of reference points more formally as benchmarks (Charbonneau and Van
Ryzin 2015).
The most well-known account of reference dependent judgment is provided in prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Here reference dependence implies that citizens make judgment about
a public organization’s performance in terms of losses or gains compared to a reference point. An
implication is that the same piece of absolute performance information can be evaluated differently
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depending on the framing of the reference point. In social and cognitive psychology, many have ar-
gued that individuals are deeply inclined to evaluate their own abilities and opinions in relative terms
and not in absolute ones (Festinger 1954). Our perception of everything from light, sound, to colors
will have a strong relative component (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Kahneman 1992). The same
holds for the social world where changes matter more to citizens’ understanding of value than abso-
lute levels (Markowitz 1952). Changes or differences contains a relative component: a comparison of
the value at hand with the standard of the past. In fact, across a number of fields we find the notion that
performance is coded as either a loss or gain, success or failure, negative or positive, and good or bad
depending on how the object of evaluation falls relative to some reference point that informs expec-
tations, aspirations, or norms (March and Simon 1958; Cyert and March 1963; Kahneman, Knetsch,
and Thaler 1991; Greve 1998; Heath 1999; Meier et al. 2015). For instance, in organizational science,
reference points can serve as goals or aspirational levels for the performance of organizations or in-
dividuals (March and Simon 1958). Comparing outcomes to some reference point for performance
provides a measure of attainment discrepancy and places performance in a domain of either ”falling
short” or ”making the cut” (March 1988).1
Some attribute this binary division of information around a reference point to bounded rationality:
The reference point is a heuristic to overcome limited cognitive capabilities and the complexity of
the information at hand (Simon 1955; James 2011a; Olsen 2013). In fact, in some of the early calls
for comparative performance information for citizens, we also find an implicit reliance on a model of
bounded rationality for human cognition: ”The human brain cannot absorb series of unrelated figures
without a yardstick by which it can judge them. What is a yardstick of state costs? Since there is
no objective standard, comparisons are the only means of arriving at relative judgment.” (Freeman
(1954, 124). We can therefore view the reference point as a judgmental shortcut that allows citizens
to form evaluations about abstract numerical performance information which they possess no deeper
knowledge about (Mussweiler 2003). Judgment about an absolute performance number requires some
1In studies of consumer and citizen satisfaction, reference points are seen as informing the expectations which citizens
have to public services (Oliver 1980). These expectations are important as they directly feed into citizens’ subjective
satisfaction with the public sector. In the widely applied expectations-disconfirmation model, satisfaction is formed by
the discrepancy between expectations and the experienced performance (VanRyzin 2004; 2013).
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scale-specific information. What is the possible interval of the scale? What is the mean of the scale
and what is its distribution? With the help of comparison, the task shifts to comparing the abstract
absolute performance of an organization with a reference point. However, comparison is not just a
simplifying shortcut. Social psychologists have found that relative comparisons are efficient because
they lead to faster decision making without resulting in worse decisions (Mussweiler and Posten 2009).
Comparison has also been found to reduce judgmental uncertainty (Mussweiler and Epstude 2011).
In summary, we have multiple accounts of the importance of reference points spanning psychology,
political science, organizational science, and public administration. Against this backdrop, we expect
that relative comparisons should be important for citizens’ judgment of organizational performance.
Moreover, citizens’ evaluation of performance information will be influenced by relative calculations
even in the presence of absolute performance measures.
Where to Look for Comparison? Historical vs. Social Reference Points
At this point we have simply pointed out that reference points are what informs citizens’ relative
evaluation of performance information. However, as Levy (1997, 100) has noted, we are often left
with ”a reference-dependent theory without a theory of the reference point”. There are can be many
sources of reference points (Tversky and Kahneman 1981; Yockey and Kruml 2009). Herbert Simon
was already in his early years arguing for comparisons ”across time” or ”with other organizations” as
the most natural point of departure when seeking out a reference point for performance comparisons
(Simon 1939). One of the earliest examples of this is found in Simon (1937, 525):
”Where is the data to be obtained? There are two possible sources: either from an ex-
amination of trends within a city over a period of years, or from an examination of data
gathered from a number of cities or from different sections of the same city.”
In essence, Simon argues that comparisons are either (internal) with-in-subject over time or (ex-
ternal) between-subject across space. In the following we will refer to these as 1) historical reference
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points (i.e., comparisons across time) and 2) social reference points (i.e., comparisons between units).2
Across a number fields, there has been a dual focus on both types of reference points. In psychology,
social and historical reference points have been contrasted for individuals’ self-evaluation (Robinson-
Whelen and Kiecolt-Galser 1997). Crosby (1976) cites Sorokin (1925, 72) for a very illustrative quote
on social and historical reference points wealth evaluations: “poverty or wealth of a man is measured,
not by what he has at present but by what he used to have before or what others have”. Contrasting
social and historical reference points for organizational performance evaluation has a long tradition
in organizational science (Greve 1998). Cyert and March (1963) viewed organizational aspirations as
the combined product of the performance of others (social comparison) and an organization’s own
past performance (i.e. historical comparison). Decision makers are also expected to care about perfor-
mance relative to that of other organizations as well as the organization’s own historical performance
(Heath 1999). As March and Simon notes (1958: 203–204):
”The level of satisfactory performance is likely to be very close to the actual achieved
level of recent performance...Individuals adjust their criteria to the achieved levels of other
individuals with whom they compare themselves, and to the levels that are established
as norms by relevant reference groups. Organizations adjust their criteria to the levels
achieved by other organizations.”
Let’s begin by looking closer at historical comparisons where individuals compare current perfor-
mance with some past historical reference point. Here, we focus explicitly on historical comparison
within a given organization in order to draw a sharp distinction to social comparison. Historical ref-
erence points emphasize that citizens care about what direction of change in performance an organi-
zation is experiencing. We find this very pronounced in the tradition of retrospective voting studies
which emphasizes the calculation of differences between current and past performance as a means
for prospective evaluation of the incumbent government (James and John 2007). For in stance, Hibbs
(1982, 314) argued that citizens’ evaluation of performance was driven by comparing the cumulative
2In studies of benchmarking these two reference points are often referred to as internal and external (Foltin 1999; Bird et
al. 2005).
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performance of the current administration with the performance of previous administrations. Histor-
ical reference points are clearly the most broadly used reference point for performance comparison
in political science (Kayser and Peress 2012, 680). The status-quo-bias can be seen as another exam-
ple of historical comparison (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988). Past performance is the status quo
which current performance is evaluated against. If current performance is below past performance it
will be seen as a worsening. In addition to Herbert Simon, we also find an emphasis on historical
comparisons in Ridley (1937: 33) who notes that a good report of performance entails ”comparative
data” where ”the present year’s accomplishments should be compared with those of previous years”.
With the existing theoretical and empirical work in mind we propose the first hypothesis about relative
performance evaluation:
HISTORICAL REFERENCE POINTS (H1): Providing information about better past per-
formance of an organization will lower citizens’ assessment of current performance and
providing information about worse past performance of an organization will raise citi-
zens’ assessment of current performance.
Social reference points offer an alternative source of comparison. In social comparisons, individ-
uals compare current performance with the performance simultaneously obtained by others. Whether
individuals explicitly seek it out or not, the environment will inevitably provide information about the
achievement of others (Chapman and Volkmann 1939). We simply cannot ignore the outcomes of sim-
ilar entities. This broad idea has been framed differently across fields and research traditions. The idea
is reflected in the theoretical traditions of bandwagon effects or ”keeping up with the Joneses” in early
studies of consumer behavior and public opinion (Pierce 1940; Leibenstein 1950). Reference group
theory also denotes comparison with external others when making judgment about oneself (Shibu-
tani 1955). The research tradition on relative deprivation reflects a similar sentiment (Runciman 1961;
Stark and Taylor 1991). Perhaps the most successful formulation of the idea is found in social com-
parison theory (Festinger 1954). Social comparison theory states that we have an urge to evaluate our
own opinions and abilities by comparing them with the opinions and abilities of similar others. For
instance, in studies of health, happiness, and wealth, there is strong evidence of relative comparison
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with others (Brickman and Campbell 1971). The health, happiness, and wealth we observe around us
affect our personal self-assessment on these dimensions.
Initially, social comparison was seen as affected by the availability of absolute information. In
other words, social comparison was a second best option in the absence of absolute information.
Modern accounts of reference dependence find that relative social comparison can be relevant even
if absolute measures are available (Moore 2007).3 In economics and political science, we have seen
some indirect application of social comparison processes which can be useful for our purpose. Salmon
(1987) introduced the idea of social reference points with his yardstick theory for holding government
accountable. He argues that historical comparisons will constitute a very noisy reference point for
comparison with current performance. Over time, there will be exogenous disturbances. There can be
business cycles and long-term trends which cannot be factored in when comparing the present situation
with past times. Instead, citizens’ are better off by applying neighboring jurisdictions or other similar
social reference points as a means for comparison with current performance (Hansen et al. 2014).
In public administration, Charbonneau and Van Ryzin (2015) found evidence of that citizens rely on
national averages to compare individual organizational performance against. Along the same line we
expect the following effect of social reference points:
SOCIAL REFERENCE POINTS (H2): Providing information about better performance among
other organizations will lower citizens’ assessment of an organization’s current perfor-
mance and providing information about worse performance among other organizations
will raise citizens’ assessment of an organization’s current performance.
The Negativity Bias and Reference Points
The negativity bias has gained considerable attention in the study of citizens’ attitudinal and behav-
ioral responses to performance information (James and John 2007; Boyne et al. 2009; James 2011a;
2011b; James and Moseley 2015; Olsen 2015). The negativity bias stresses an asymmetrical response
3Goodman and Haisley (2007) pointed out that most social comparison research focus on how individuals apply infor-
mation to others. That is, social comparison refers to self-other comparisons. Few studies apply the insights of social
comparisons to organizational level analysis (Greve 1998, 60). However, social comparison theory point to the impor-
tance of general comparison processes and not exclusively on individual comparisons (Goodman and Haisley 2007, 115).
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to positive and negative information where ”negative events are more salient, potent, dominant in
combinations, and generally efficacious than positive events” (Rozin and Royzman 2001, 297). The
final hypothesis focuses on differences in citizens’ response to performance information depending on
the relative performance being above or below the reference point. In economic voting studies, there
are multiple accounts of a negativity bias in response to historical-temporal reference points. That is,
a worsening economy damages the incumbent to a greater degree than an improving economy helps.
For instance, Kinder and Kiewiet (1979) found evidence of decreasing voter support for the incumbent
only if the unemployment rate went up. The negativity bias is also reflected in media coverage. Soroka
(2006) found that negative economic performance is covered more widely in the media than positive
economic performance of a similar magnitude.
In the study of performance information in public administration the findings have been more
mixed–but with some indication of a negativity bias. Across, two studies James (2011a; 2011b) only
found partial support for negativity bias in various field and survey experiments with performance
data. In an observational study, Boyne et al. (2009) found that performance information has a asym-
metrical effect on support for the incumbent among English local governments. Only bad performance
is punished while good performance is not rewarded. Olsen (2015) find indirect evidence of a negativ-
ity bias as citizens respond more strongly to a negative worded ”dissatisfaction rate” than a logically
similar ”satisfaction rate” in an equivalence framing experiment. These results align with James and
Moseley (2014) who find that negative performance information has more profound effects across a
number of dimensions.
The core question becomes how this asymmetry plays out in a context of relative performance
evaluation. Reference points and the negativity bias have a close connection, because the reference
point is likely to decide if an organizations performance is determined to be good or bad. Reference
points make the valence of an organizations performance more salient. A core insight in prospect
theory was an asymmetrical effect around the reference point with larger effects in the domain of losses
than in the domain of gains (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; 1991). In a similar manner, we expect
that the negativity bias implies that citizens respond less positively to ”relative good” performance
compared with their response to ”relatively bad” of the same magnitude:
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NEGATIVETY BIAS (H3): If an organization performance worse than the reference point,
it will have a stronger effect on citizens’ assessment of performance than if organizational
performance is better than the reference point.
DATA AND DESIGN
Two Experiments in a Large Nationally Representative Sample
We have outlined a set of causal predictions about how citizens evaluate public services given some
specific variations in the relative performance. The causal nature of these predictions imply that an
experimental test is the most appropriate design. With experiments we can directly manipulate and
randomly assign the absolute and relative performance information which citizens are exposed to. The
hypotheses outlined above will be tested with a set of experiments embedded in an online survey.
Experimental designs have been applied in a recent string of research on how citizens apply perfor-
mance information in their considerations (James 2011a; Charbonneau & Van Ryzin 2015; Baekgaard
and Serritzlew 2015). Given the expectations outlined above, we need an experimental design which
can both (a) compare the relative effect of social reference points with that of historical reference
points, and (b) compare relatively negative performance with relatively positive performance of a sim-
ilar magnitude. In order to do so, we employ a set of experiments which were conducted in a large
nationally representative sample of the Danish population.
Participating subjects
The experiments were conducted in a survey fielded in YouGov’s Danish online panel which consists
of 40,000 Danes. 4 Respondents were recruited to participate via e-mail with an embedded link to the
survey. In total, 3443 subjects participated in the experiments which yielded a response rate of 42%.5
The sampling frame for the study was restricted to citizens between the age of 18 to 74. The sample
was pre-stratified on gender, region, age, and party choice at the most recent national election (2011).
4The panel is recruited via both online, radio and newspaper ads as well as through telephone surveys. The survey was
conducted between the 15th of October and the 22th of October (2012).
5In total 8.204 were invited to participate in the survey.
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Table 1 below shows descriptive statistics of the sample and highlights a near nationally representative
sample in terms of age, gender, education, and region of residence.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Pct.
Gender (male) 49.8%
Age (mean years) 50.5 (SD=15)
Education
High school or less 18.4%
Vocational training 24.7%
Short-cycle tertiary 12.9%
Medium-cycle tertiary 28.6%
Long-cycle tertiary 15.5%
Geographical region
Capital area 24.7%
Zealand 15.3%
Southern Denmark 23.9%
Middle Jutland 23.8%
Northern Jutland 12.3%
CAWI (computer-assisted web interviewing) survey. Note: n=3443.
In comparison with other recent experiments in the field this sample diverge on two important
dimensions. First, it is a very large sample (n=3443) which allows us to obtain the necessary statis-
tical power for disentangling many components in the same experimental design–including various
reference points and varying distances between an organization’s performance and the reference point
performance. Secondly, by employing a nationally representative sample we provide strong external
validity of the results for people with diverse backgrounds and experiences with performance infor-
mation. We hereby make sure that the findings we may uncover are not contingent on some specific
characteristic of the sample but can be generalized to the public-at-large.
Two Experimental Vignettes
The two experiments focus on school grades and local government unemployment rates as examples
of performance data. School grades provide an example of a performance measure which represents a
specific public service. Education performance information is widely published today in most devel-
oped countries. Unemployment rates are, on the other hand, an example of a more general economic
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performance indicator which dominates media coverage of national or local performance (Soroka
2006). The actual content and setup of the two experiments differed. However, for both studies the ex-
perimental design entails randomized treatments at two levels. The first level of treatments randomly
assign subjects to either: (1) absolute performance, (2) absolute performance and an absolute social
reference point, and (3) absolute performance and an absolute historical reference point. The first level
of treatment allows for both comparing the effects of absolute performance with the effect relative to
some reference points, and for determining variations in relative effects for both social and historical
reference points. The second level of treatment randomizes the actual numerical content of the perfor-
mance information which the subjects were provided with. The second level provides a unique setting
for understanding how citizens process relatively bad vs. relatively good performance information. It
is also an optimal robustness check for understanding sensitivities in evaluations for different degrees
of relative performance.6
Experiment I: Citizens’ Evaluation of School Grade Averages
The first experiment deals with the research question in a setting of education performance data. In
Denmark, the Ministry of Education has released unadjusted school grade averages for all elementary
schools over the course of the last ten years. Subjects were randomly assigned one of three different
treatments providing subjects with different absolute performance and/or different reference points.
An overview of the different conditions is provided in table 2. Under the first treatment, subjects are
only provided with the absolute grade average of an unnamed school (n=1156). This is a form of
control state without any reference point information where we can observe the effect for difference
levels of absolute performance. In the social comparison treatment, the subjects are presented with the
absolute grade average of an unnamed school along with a municipal grade average for all schools
in the same municipality (n=1148). Finally, for the historical comparison treatment subjects were
presented with the average grade of a school along with the previous year’s average grade level of
the same school (n=1139). Operationalizing the historical treatment is more straightforward than the
6As the survey experiment comprises two experiments their order was randomized to avoid sequence effect across the
different treatments.
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social comparison as it is only a matter of determining the temporal lag on the reference point. Here,
a one year lag is used as it resembles the actual rate of publication of grade averages in Denmark. The
social comparison case is trickier as comparison with others can happen in numerous ways. In social
comparison theory, it is argued that individuals seek out comparison with others that are believed to
have similar characteristics which affect performance (Goethals nad Darley 1977). Recent studies of
benchmarking has also relied on similar operationalizations of national or local averages (James 2011;
Charbonneau and Van Ryzin 2015). Here, I apply schools from the same municipality which both are
likely to share some common characteristics and which are also located close to each other.7
Table 2: Experimental design: School grade averages with varying reference points
Baseline question:
Each year, the Ministry of Education releases a grade average for all schools in the country.
How well do you think this school is doing?
Treatment frames:
Absolute level only (n=1156) Social comparison (n=1148) Historical comparison (n=1139)
Treatment texts:
The school has a grade average
of x.
The school has a grade average
of x1. The grade average for all
schools in the same municipality
is x2.
The school has a grade average
of x1. The schools grade average
was last year x2.
Numerical treatments:
x ∈ N(µ = 6.5,σ = 1.0) x1 ∈ N(µ = 6.5,σ = 1.0), x2 ∈
N(µ = 6.5,σ = 1.0), x1 ⊥ x2
x1 ∈ N(µ = 6.5,σ = 1.0), x2 ∈
N(µ = 6.5,σ = 1.0), x1 ⊥ x2
Note: 6.5 percent was the national grade average for all schools at the time of the study.
At the second stage of treatment, the actual school grade values are drawn from a normal distribu-
tion with an average of 6.5 and a standard deviation of 1.0. Higher grade averages correspond to better
results.8 The mean grade average corresponds to the actual grade average obtained for all schools in
2011. The distribution reflects, to some degree, the school grade averages people would experience
in their everyday life. School grade averages will therefore constitute a performance measure which
most individuals have some familiarity with.9 For each subject, a grade value is drawn independently
7In Denmark, public schools are governed by municipalities and school choice is most likely to happen within the bound-
aries of the same municipality.
8The Danish grade scale is a 7-point scale with values from worst to best: -3, 0, 2, 4, 7, 10, and 12. It is directly comparable
to an American scale where 12 corresponds to an A, and both 0 and -3 represent an F.
9The averages are presented with one decimal which corresponds to how the government and the media would normally
report them. Individual grade averages for students are also presented this way in the final exam transcripts.
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from a distribution with the above mentioned mean and standard deviation. That is, for the absolute
treatment subjects are presented with only one value drawn randomly from this distribution. For the
two reference point treatments, subjects are provided with two values randomly drawn from the same
distribution: one for the absolute level of the unnamed school, and one for the social or historical ref-
erence point. For instance, some subjects have been told that the municipality has an average of 5.5
and the average for all other schools in the municipality is 6.8. In a similar manner, other subjects one
of more than 50 different combinations of relative performance. This implies that the findings will be
valid and robust for a large range of different levels of both absolute and relative performance. Often
survey experiments only present subjects with a few sets of various values or written descriptions.
As the dependent variable subjects were asked to provide their assessment of the school. For all
conditions, the subjects should score their response on a slider scale from 0 to 100 where 0 was labeled
very bad and 100 was labeled very good. A graphical presentation of the scale is provided in appendix
A (figure 3). Across all conditions the average response was 52.83 with a standard deviation of 20.18.
Experiment II: Citizens’ Evaluation of Municipal Unemployment Rates
The second experiment is similar to the first one in terms of the general setup. However, the substantive
setting is different as citizens are asked to evaluate municipal unemployment performance based on
information about local unemployment rates. The wording of treatment conditions are outlined in table
3. In the baseline condition, subjects are only provided with the absolute unemployment rate in an un-
named municipality (n=1155). In the social comparison treatment, the subjects are presented with the
absolute unemployment rate of the unnamed municipality along with a hypothetical national unem-
ployment rate (n=1142). Finally, in the historical reference point treatment, subjects were provided the
unemployment rate of the unnamed municipality along with previous years’ absolute unemployment
rate in the same municipality (n=1146).
At the second stage of treatment, subjects are assigned a randomly drawn unemployment rate.
For the unemployment rates, the values are drawn from a normal distribution with a mean of 6.3%
and a standard deviation of 1.0%. The average corresponds to the national unemployment rate in
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Table 3: Experimental design: Local unemployment rates with varying reference points
Baseline question:
How well do you think that this municipality is doing in terms of unemployment?
Treatment frames:
Absolute level only (n=1555) Social comparison (n=1142) Historical comparison (n=1146)
Treatment texts:
The municipality has an unem-
ployment rate of x%.
The municipality has an unem-
ployment rate of x1%. The un-
employment rate in the rest of
the country is x2%.
The municipality has an unem-
ployment rate of x1%. The mu-
nicipality had last year an unem-
ployment rate of x2%.
Numerical treatments:
x ∈ N(µ = 6.3,σ = 1.0) x1 ∈ N(µ = 6.3,σ = 1.0), x2 ∈
N(µ = 6.3,σ = 1.0), x1 ⊥ x2
x1 ∈ N(µ = 6.3,σ = 1.0), x2 ∈
N(µ = 6.3,σ = 1.0), x1 ⊥ x2
Note: 6.3% was the average national unemployment rate at the time of the study.
Denmark available at the time of the study. For each treatment status, unemployment rates are drawn
independently from a distribution with the above parameters. For the relative frames, two independent
values were drawn from this distribution: one for the unnamed municipality, and one for the national
average (social reference point) or last year’s unemployment rate (historical comparison). The same
response scale was used as in the experimental school vignette. The average response was 50.63 with
a standard deviation of 20.93.
If the random assignment of subjects have worked as intended, we would expect groups to be prob-
abilistically similar. Table 7 in the appendix B shows descriptive statistics of the numerical treatment
variables and selected background variables across the three main treatment groups for both exper-
iments. The first three variables are the second stage of randomization included in the experiment
which randomly assigned values of absolute and reference point performance across the main treat-
ment groups. Naturally, we do not want the main treatment groups to differ in terms of the numerical
treatment. If that was the case, then we would not be able to seperate the effect of the type of reference
point from the actual absolute and relative level of performance. As expected there is not variation in
the performance assigned across the treatment groups. The relative performance variable simply cap-
ture the difference between the absolute performance and the reference point performance. Looking
at background characteristics of the subjects also shows no systematic variation between treatment
groups.
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EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Relative Performance Information: Effect of Social and Historical Reference Points
First, we turn to the task of comparing the effects of social and historical reference point across the
two experimental vignettes. Results from both experiments are shown in table 4 below. Here we can
estimate and compare the causal effects of the randomized performance numbers across the different
treatment groups. Column A shows the effect of the treatments where subjects were only provided
the absolute level of the organization being evaluated. In columns marked B the models for the social
reference point treatments are provided. Finally, columns C provides the results from the historical
reference point treatment conditions. As all independent variables are randomized we can interpret the
coefficients as causal effects. Furthermore, as the a the same scale is used as dependent variable we
can compare effect sizes between treatment groups and across experiments.
Results from the school grade experiment shows the following: In the absolute performance treat-
ment in column A the absolute grade average is highly positively correlated with citizens’ evaluation
of school performance. This simply indicates that the subjects evaluated the unnamed school around
8.5 points higher for each average grade point. It tells us that the subjects attended to the informa-
tion of grade averages as one would expect: better performing schools are given better evaluations by
the subjects (James 2011a).10 In the next two models the numerical treatment of the reference point
is introduced. For the social reference point treatment group we observe a substantially strong and
significant negative effect of the other schools’ grade average. Simply put, citizens’ evaluation of a
school’s performance worsens by -7.5 points for each higher grade point average among the reference
point schools. This provides strong support for the importance social reference points for citizens eval-
uation of performance (H2). Moving on to the historical reference point treatment group we also find a
negative effect. However, at -4.3 the effect is substantially weaker by 3.2 points. It provides support for
the importance of historical reference points (H1), but also indicates that they might be substantively
weaker than social reference points. This difference is also notable via the much higher adjusted R2
for the social reference point condition compared with the historical one (R2 .34 vs. R2 .26).
10Graphs of all the simple correlations between the absolute performance and the evaluation is shown in Appendix C.
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In table 5 the difference between the social and historical reference points are tested directly. This
is done by pooling the data from the two treatments and interacting the reference point value variable
with a dummy indicating the type of reference point (i.e, social or historical). In the first column we
can note that the 3.2 points difference is highly significant. Overall, we find strong support for the
importance of both reference points, but also that social reference point affected citizens’ evaluation
of school performance substantially more than the historical reference point.
Results from the unemployment experiment shows the following: As expected the absolute treat-
ment in column A in table 4 shows a significant negative effect of a municipality’s unemployment
rate on citizens’ evaluation of municipal unemployment performance. In this context, the interpreta-
tion of the coefficients is reversed as they now measure a negative outcome (unemployment rates) as
opposed to the positive measure of school grade averages. This being said, the effect of about -4.6
is much lower than we saw in the school case. The same holds for the R2. Exposure to the absolute
measures of unemployment rates had a much more noisy effect on the subsequent evaluation of the
unnamed municipality. It indicates that citizens are less sure of how the unemployment information
affects their impression of unemployment performance. One explanation could be that citizens rec-
ognize that unemployment rates are more affected by exogenous factors than school grade averages.
They are therefore more reluctant to evaluate unemployment performance based on the unemployment
rate alone. However, turning to the reference points we can see how they become an important aid for
evaluating the more ambiguous level of unemployment in absolute terms:
The next two columns of models show the effect of the two reference point treatments. The social
reference point of the national unemployment rate shows a positive effect of the same magnitude
as the negative effect of the municipality’s own unemployment rate. That is, citizens’ evaluate the
target municipality’s unemployment performance 7.8 points better if the national unemployment rate
increases by 1 percentage point (H2).
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Table 4: Absolute, Social, and Historical Comparisons
Experiment and Treatment Groups:
School Grade Average Municipal Unemployment Rate
A: Absolute B: Social ref. C: Historical ref. A: Absolute B: Social ref. C: Historical ref.
Absolute Performance 8.46∗∗∗ 10.45∗∗∗ 9.09∗∗∗ −4.62∗∗∗ −7.76∗∗∗ −5.79∗∗∗
(0.48) (0.51) (0.51) (0.61) (0.54) (0.56)
Reference Point Performance −7.51∗∗∗ −4.29∗∗∗ 7.16∗∗∗ 4.34∗∗∗
(0.52) (0.50) (0.52) (0.55)
Constant −3.57 35.86∗∗∗ 20.87∗∗∗ 79.34∗∗∗ 53.64∗∗∗ 61.57∗∗∗
(3.18) (4.65) (4.70) (3.90) (4.75) (4.91)
Observations 1,156 1,148 1,139 1,155 1,142 1,146
R2 0.21 0.35 0.26 0.05 0.25 0.13
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.34 0.26 0.05 0.25 0.12
Residual Std. Error 16.45 17.65 17.18 21.24 17.67 19.15
F Statistic 306.10∗∗∗ 301.59∗∗∗ 200.77∗∗∗ 58.25∗∗∗ 192.52∗∗∗ 82.68∗∗∗
Note: OLS estimates. SEs in parentheses. ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table 5: Different Effects of Social and Historical Reference Points
Experiment:
School Grade Average Municipal Unemployment
Absolute Performance 9.79∗∗∗ −6.73∗∗∗
(0.36) (0.39)
Ref. Point Performance −4.27∗∗∗ 4.36∗∗∗
(0.50) (0.53)
Ref. Point Type (1 = Social) 23.75∗∗∗ −20.14∗∗∗
(4.73) (4.83)
Ref. Type ∗ Ref. Performance −3.21∗∗∗ 2.78∗∗∗
(0.72) (0.76)
Constant 16.19∗∗∗ 67.33∗∗∗
(4.08) (4.14)
Observations 2,287 2,288
R2 0.31 0.19
Adjusted R2 0.31 0.19
Residual Std. Error 17.43 18.45
F Statistic 254.95∗∗∗ 135.51∗∗∗
Note: OLS estimates. SEs in parentheses. ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
A similar pattern is found for the historical comparison treatment where the subjects were exposed
to last year’s unemployment rate for the target municipality: Citizens’ respond negatively to higher
unemployment in the target municipality and positively to higher levels of past unemployment (H1).
Interestingly, we also here find the social reference point to be much strong than the effect of 4.3 points
found for the historical reference point. In table 5 the difference between the social and historical
reference points are tested directly. The difference in effect between two reference points amount to
2.8 and is highly significant. Furthermore, as in the school case we find much higher explanatory
power for the social reference point than the historical one (R2 .25 vs. R2 .12).
The increases in explanatory power for models with social reference points is not due to differ-
ences in how much subjects consider each treatment. Trimmed mean response times for the social
grade average treatment was 17.9 seconds, and 18.5 seconds for the historical case. In the unemploy-
ment experiment the response time was 14.7 seconds for the social treatment and 15.1 seconds for
the historical treatment. In other words: the social reference points provided slightly faster response
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times and much less noise in evaluations. This is in line with psychological research showing faster
and more efficient judgment via social comparison (Mussweiler and Epstude 2009). Finally, it is worth
noting that while performance information contribute less to the evaluation of unemployment relative
to the case of grades, we can see how the relative importance of reference points is higher for the
unemployment case. One way to capture this is to compare the relative strength of the absolute in-
formation and the reference point. For the case of unemployment these two are much more closely
aligned in magnitude. This indicates that relative performance becomes even more important if the
absolute performance measure is more ambiguous.
Taken together we find a very robust and substantially important pattern across both experimental
vignettes: Citizens are very much attuned to reference point information and they are substantially and
significantly more affected by social reference point than historical ones.
Negativity Bias and Reference Dependence
We now turn to the question of a negativity bias in citizens’ relative performance evaluations (H3).
In figures 1 and 2 the results are plotted. The x-axis shows the relative grade difference between the
organization and the reference point. Negative values denote that the organization’s performance is
numerically lower than the reference point. The fitted lines are smooth lowess fits with 95% confi-
dence intervals in order to capture non-linear trends. Separate lines are plotted for relatively good and
bad performance to allow for differences in the slope for “relatively good” and “relatively bad” perfor-
mance. The differences in slopes are more formally tested in table 5. The table includes the measure of
relative performance (i.e. difference bewteen absolute performance and reference point performance)
as shown in the figures. It also contains a simple dummy variable capturing if absolute performance
is higher than the reference point. Finally, it includes an interaction between the two variables which
captures differences in the effect of relative performance depending on absolute performance being
above or below the reference point.
First, we turn to the grade experiment in figure 1. In the social reference point treatment to the
left there is a stronger reaction in the negative domain indicated by a more steep trend line below
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(a) Social Reference Point (N=1148): Citizens’
evaluation of school performance and the relative so-
cial performance, i.e, a school’s grade average minus
the average for all schools in the same municipality.
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(b) Historical Reference Point (N=1139): Citizens
evaluation of school performance and the relative
historical performance, i.e, a school’s grade average
minus it’s average last year.
Figure 1: School Grade Average Experiment: Randomly Assigned Relative Performance
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(a) Social Reference Point (N=1142): Citizens’
evaluation of local unemployment and the relative
social performance the municipality, i.e, a municipal-
ity’s unemployment rate minus the national rate.
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(b) Historical Reference Point (N=1146): Citizens’
evaluation of local unemployment and the relative
historical performance of the municipality, i.e, a mu-
nicipality’s unemployment rate minus last years rate.
Figure 2: Municipal Unemployment Rate Experiment: Randomly Assigned Relative Performance
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the reference point as compared to above the reference point. For relatively good grades (i.e. school
grades above the reference point) the effect of an extra grade point is 5 points. However, for relatively
bad grades (i.e. school grades below the reference point) an extra grade point affects evaluations with
about 9 points. This difference in slopes is substantial and significant (cf. table 5, column I). It supports
the hypothesis of a negativity bias: a worsening af performance relative to the reference point has a
stronger effect on evaluations than a relative improvement of performance beyond the reference point.
For the case of the historical reference point the findings are more mixed. There is still a tendency
for the slope in the positive domain to be less steep than in the negative domain. However, there is
weaker evidence of a negativity bias with a difference in slopes of only 2.4 points. Next, we turn to the
unemployment experiment reported in figure 2. Here negative values indicate that the municipality’s
unemployment rate is lower than the reference point. In the social comparison case the difference
in slopes is close to zero and insignificant. In the historical case there is also no clear evidence of a
negativity bias. In summary, we find mixed evidence of a negativity bias with support in two of the
four treatment groups.
Finally, a note on the functional form for how relative performance affects citizens’ evaluations.
Looking at the graphs, marginal effects of relative performance seem larger closer to where relative
performance is zero. That is, where the absolute performance of the organization is equal to the refer-
ence point. In the unemployment case the graphs show a jump in evaluations as relative performance
crosses zero. In the grade experiment there are clear s-shaped curves. Changes in relative performance
seem more important closer to the reference point than further aways from it. Interestingly, this de-
creasing sensitivity to relative performance as the difference in performance increases is in line with
the prediction of decreasing marginal effects in prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1991). It un-
derscores the importance of comparisons as a strong predictor of citizens’ evaluation of performance
when the organization’s performance is closer to the reference point.
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Table 6: Negativity Bias
Experiment and Treatment Groups:
School Grade Average Local Unemployment Rate
B: Social ref. C: Historical ref. B: Social ref. C: Historical ref.
Relative Performance 9.25∗∗∗ 6.09∗∗∗ −4.63∗∗∗ −1.76∗
(0.85) (0.86) (0.87) (0.87)
Absolute > Ref. Point 6.61∗∗∗ 6.52∗∗∗ −8.62∗∗∗ −8.96∗∗∗
(1.73) (1.73) (1.72) (1.87)
Interaction −4.20∗∗∗ −2.40∗ −0.61 −1.63
(1.24) (1.19) (1.25) (1.31)
Constant 54.07∗∗∗ 50.25∗∗∗ 54.30∗∗∗ 57.74∗∗∗
(1.16) (1.19) (1.16) (1.24)
Observations 1,148 1,139 1,142 1,146
R2 0.35 0.24 0.27 0.14
Adjusted R2 0.35 0.24 0.27 0.14
Residual Std. Error 17.61 17.38 17.49 18.97
F Statistic 204.47∗∗∗ 122.42∗∗∗ 139.42∗∗∗ 63.69∗∗∗
Note: OLS estimation. Std. errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.05;∗∗p < 0.01;∗∗∗p < 0.001.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
More than seventy five years ago Herbert Simon (1937) argued for the importance of relative perfor-
mance evaluation–comparing absolute performance to either the past performance of an organization
or to the performance of other organizations. We have argued that Simon’s view is important for under-
standing how citizens make up their mind about the performance of public organizations when faced
with absolute numerical performance information. Across two experimental vignettes embedded in a
large nationally representative sample of citizens, we find evidence that both vindicates and extends
on Simon’s view of relative performance information:
First, we find strong support for the notion that citizens’ evaluation of an organization is affected
not only by absolute performance but also the performance relative to an available reference point.
When faced with randomly assigned absolute performance of a public organization along with an
absolute measure of a historical or social reference point, citizens will tend to base their judgment on
the difference between the absolute performance of the target organization and the reference point.
That is, when faced with two absolute performance measures citizens are likely to compute their
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difference in order to arrive at a relative measure of performance discrepancy. Performance evaluation
has a fundamental relative component (James 2011a; James and Moseley 2014).
Second, the analysis showed that not all reference points are of equal importance. Specifically,
social reference points were found to affect citizens’ evaluation to an even greater extent than historical
reference points. This was both the case when the social reference point was local (i.e., other schools
in the same municipality) as well as when the social reference point was national (i.e., the national
unemployment rate). In both cases, the relative social reference point effect was almost twice as large
as the effect for the historical reference point. This finding is in line with experimental results from
the US where (some) social reference points also have had more profound effects on evaluations than
historical ones (Charbonneau and Van Ryzin 2015).
Finally, the analysis found mixed evidence of a negativity bias in citizens’ evaluations of relative
performance. In two of the four experimental conditions, we found a much larger marginal effect on
evaluations if performance was worse than the reference point. This supports the idea of a negativity
bias in citizens’ evaluations (Rozin and Rozyman 2001). It confirms the impression that we have yet to
fully specify under which conditions a negativity bias is present (Olsen 2015). Interestingly, there was
also some indication of a decreasing sensitivity to relative performance further away from the reference
point. In addition, citizens’ evaluation of performance was stronger in close vicinity of the reference
point – in particular in the unemployment case. This speaks to the importance of the reference point as
a fundamental yardstick for coding absolute performance as either good or bad depending on it being
above or below the reference point (March and Simon 1958).
The results presented here are not without limits. In a real world setting, citizens will be exposed to
multiple reference points when evaluating an organization. Often there will be multiple opportunities
for various simultaneous historical and social comparisons. What if an organization has improved it’s
performance compared to last year but is still below in a salient social comparison? Maybe citizens’
judgment will be more ambivalent and characterized by mixed feelings (Kahneman 1992). The present
study confronted citizens with various reference points in isolation and compared their relative impact.
Future studies should seek to disentangle the effects of multiple reference points and move the question
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of reference points into venues that more directly mimic the complexities of political-administrative
settings. This being said, a survey experiment as presented here is an important first step to provide
some initial support for Simon’s propositions about the importance of relative performance evaluation.
The findings offer three broader implications for public managers and future research: First, the
findings contribute to the almost century old ambition of providing an experimental foundation for
how citizens’ are affected by the presentation of performance information (Upton 1915; Freeman
1954; Williams 2003). While this effort at first hand may seem like a technical detail, it is in fact the
very core of the accountability role that performance data often is intended to serve: Enhancing this
role requires a deep empirical understanding of how the public-at-large makes up their mind about
public services when confronted with performance data (Lee 2006a; 2006b). The findings here stress
that the selection of reference points for benchmarking is fundamental to how citizens are affected by
performance data. Reference points enduce a shift in how citizens evaluate the absolute performance
of an organization. Reference points also give performance data a potent effect on citizens evaluations
without increasing the time or effort spend. It is thus one of the key variables which we should focus
on as we progress to understand the various dimensions of performance data which affect citizens’
evaluation of public services.
Second, from a research stand point the findings at the citizen-level raises important questions
about downstream effects on how managers and policy makers can shift reference points in order to
change the perception among citizens’ of how well their organization is performing (Moynihan 2008:
107–109). Early on, Simon and Ridley (1938: 467) noted this in their discussion of municipal report-
ing: ”Figures don’t lie, but liars do figure, and the citizen has very little defense in this field, as in other
realms of reporting and advertising, against deliberate deception or misinformation”. With citizens’
reliance on social comparisons, public managers are incentivized to keep up with the performance
that citizens observe in other organizations (Hansen et al. 2014). The natural research question then
becomes if managers aim to affect the reference point against which their own performance is com-
pared against? One interpretation of the findings would be that social reference points offer a better
opportunity for framing current performance than historical reference point do. Managers will have
a harder time forming their own history of performance than they will have pointing to other poorly
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performing organizations which may shed a more positive light on the manager’s own organization. In
addition, from the negativity bias in social comparisons, we may expect that managers aim for down-
ward comparisons, i.e., to point to the performance of organizations doing worse than their own. Taken
together, the findings provide a micro-level foundation for how citizens respond to relative compar-
isons which in turn can help generate hypotheses about how managers and policy makers respond to
and affect the presentation of their own organization’s performance. Here lies a potential for under-
standing more subtle ways of gaming and manipulating performance data than we traditionally have
thought of (Smith 1995; Kelman and Friedman 2009).
Third, the results provide a potential explanation for many puzzles concerning both the difficulty
of increasing citizen satisfaction and the weak correlation between objective and subjective measures
of performance (Parks 1984; Boyne 2003). If performance evaluations have a strong relative com-
ponent, then the provision of performance information can induce a form of ’hedonic treadmill’ as
has been found for perceptions of personal wealth and happiness (Brickman 1971). If evaluations are
relative then satisfaction with service remain constant as long as everyone improves on a given metric.
Moreover, the strong social comparison effect might also help explain why objective measures of per-
formance can show improvements without being reflected in subjective perceptions of performance
at the citizen level (Van Ryzin 2004). For instance, large increases in absolute objective performance
will only partly affect subjective evaluation of the organization as long as the social reference point
also has improved it’s performance.
Taken together, we now know that citizens’ evaluation of an organizations from performance data
is fundamentally relative. Citizens base their judgment on a comparison between absolute performance
and an available reference point. This is particular true if the reference point provides the performance
of other similar organizations. Citizens’ performance evaluation is fundamentally a relative process.
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Appendix A
Figure 3: Screen caption of the exact response scale used in the experiment. The scale varies from
”very bad” (”meget da˚rligt”, 0) to ”very good” (”meget godt”, 100).
Appendix B
Table 7: Randomization Check across Experiment and Treatment Groups
Experiment and Treatment Groups:
School Grade Average: Municipal Unemployment Rate:
Absolute Social Historical Absolute Social Historical
Absolute performance 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.4 6.4 6.3
Ref. point performance – 6.5 6.5 – 6.3 6.3
Relative performance – 0.01 0.03 – 0.06 -0.02
Gender (%) 50.5 50.2 48.6 51.9 48.8 48.5
Age (years) 50.1 50.5 50.1 50.7 50.3 50.5
Left-wing voter, 2011 (%) 53.6 51.8 54.5 54.3 50.8 54.8
Education 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.8
Private sector emp. (%) 31.9 34.5 31.4 33.3 33.5 31.0
Copenahgen area (%) 26.3 24.0 23.6 24.0 25.4 24.7
Note: Means for each experimental group.
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Figure 4: School grade experiment: the plots show the correlation between the absolute grade for the
target school under the three treatment frames and the evaluation provided by the citizens. The flexible
fit is a lowess estimation.
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Figure 5: Unemployment rate experiment: the plots show the correlation between the unemployment
rate for the target municipality under the three treatment frames and the evaluation provided by the
citizens. The flexible fit is a lowess estimation.
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